{"id":16984,"date":"2026-03-30T05:13:43","date_gmt":"2026-03-30T05:13:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/?p=16984"},"modified":"2026-04-21T23:56:55","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T23:56:55","slug":"ituri-mecanique-des-fluides-dun-conflit-ignore","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/ituri-mecanique-des-fluides-dun-conflit-ignore\/","title":{"rendered":"Ituri: fluid mechanics of an ignored conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-group has-background\" style=\"background-color: #0b1810; padding: 64px 48px 64px 48px;\"><div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-752623e8 wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\r\n\r\n\r\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\" style=\"font-size: clamp(2rem,5vw,3.75rem); font-weight: 800; line-height: 1.15; letter-spacing: -0.02em; color: #ffffff; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 24px;\">Ituri: fluid mechanics of an ignored conflict<\/h1>\r\n\r\n\r\n<\/div><\/div>\r\n\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 36px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-group has-background\" style=\"border-radius: 4px; border-left: 5px solid #1a7a3c; background-color: #fafafa; padding: 24px 32px 24px 32px;\"><div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-227e4af2 wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.9; color: #333333;\">By <strong>Fiston Mahamba Larousse<\/strong> \u00e0 <strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene<\/strong>, actuary, economist and expert in conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes.<\/p>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 48px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">What is your personal analysis of the current security situation in Ituri province, with armed attacks against civilians as well as the resurgence of local self-defence militias and others active from abroad such as Thomas Lubanga's CRP, whose headquarters are based in Kampala?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> I believe we need to separate two or three distinct yet interconnected dynamics in Ituri, which feed into one another and complicate any lasting way out of the crisis. Firstly, we are seeing the resurgence of armed groups stemming from the wars of the early 2000s. These factions, often built on the ruins of former militias that were defeated or partially integrated into the peace process, are the direct legacy of poor management of the collective trauma caused by past inter-ethnic violence. They originate from the lack of psychological and community follow-up, the institutional vacuum left in the reconstruction of social fabrics, and the persistent feeling of abandonment among populations in the face of repeated massacres. The desire for vengeance remains latent, fuelled by the absence of a comprehensive and credible transitional justice process. Occasional trials and convictions have never been followed by robust reconciliation initiatives or sustainable peaceful coexistence programmes. As long as these wounds remain open, they will continue to serve as a matrix for the cyclical reformation of community-based armed groups.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">To this is added the security contagion effect from North Kivu. The geographical and social porosity between North Kivu and Ituri fosters the infiltration of crises. The security haemorrhage caused by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) terrorism in northern North Kivu is gradually spreading towards southern and western Ituri, particularly in the territories of Irumu and Mambasa. These infiltrations exacerbate inter-communal mistrust, undermine economic circuits and trigger a proliferation of local militias. Self-protection organisations, often structured along ethnic lines, are multiplying, oscillating between legitimate community resistance and instrumentalisation for more opaque agendas. (<!-- wp:read-more)Dans certaines zones, notamment agricoles, l'\u00e9conomie de guerre se superpose aux rivalit\u00e9s fonci\u00e8res, comme dans les r\u00e9gions o\u00f9 les cultures vivri\u00e8res ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transform\u00e9es en plantations commerciales de cacao ou de caf\u00e9, ce qui entretient des logiques de pr\u00e9dation.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">Finally, a third register, less intense militarily but more visible in the media, is that of politico-military movements positioning themselves with a view to a national political dialogue. These actors often revive the rhetoric of protecting threatened ethnicities to legitimise their actions and build up political capital. Their agenda goes beyond simple community defense, as some seek to secure a place in potential national or regional negotiations. This presence blurs the reading of local dynamics, as it mixes field issues with larger-scale power strategies.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">If we want to prevent Ituri from remaining trapped in a perpetual cycle of violence, we will need to articulate a response that repairs social fractures through a credible mechanism of justice and reconciliation, locks down territorial control and strengthens regional cooperation to counter cross-border infiltrations, and dismantles war economies by transforming high-risk areas into hubs of local development. It is only by integrating these approaches into a strategic vision that is both local and national that Ituri can hope to regain stability and reconnect with lasting prosperity.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">What is the main cause of the current conflict, and do you think it bears an ethnic character or could become one as was the case 20 years ago?<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> In reality, there is not a single true cause for the conflicts in Ituri, but a constellation of factors that all converge on the same point: the disintegration of public authority and the effective absence of the state. As in other eastern provinces, each conflict has its own logic, its own history, its own actors. Each therefore requires a fine reading and adapted responses, far from the batteries of standardised solutions applied mechanically. Understanding the specificity of each conflict thus becomes the first essential step before bringing a solution.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">The most visible, and by far the most heavily publicised, is the one categorised under conflicts relating to land access and succession disputes. These disputes, rooted in land and inheritance management, very quickly turn into clashes labelled as ethnic. This is a dangerous oversimplification: describing a land or power struggle as an \u00ab interethnic conflict \u00bb allows state authorities to shirk their responsibilities by framing the protagonists as mere primitives incapable of coexisting. This ethnic labelling devalues the belligerents, reduces their voices to an irrational quarrel and strips the crisis of any structural analysis. Yet behind these generic terms lie much more conventional realities: living space and population growth are out of balance, land distribution is often inequitable, and economic or political tensions compound local rivalries.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">We must also acknowledge that certain local powers, superimposed onto the colonial map, no longer have the legitimacy or capacity to regulate tensions of a certain magnitude. As in Kivu, certain chiefdoms, having become impotent or even toxic, would deserve to be replaced by more suitable administrative entities: sectors endowed with a firm and inclusive territoriality, multi-ethnic, or even completely emancipated from ethnic bases. Local governance, rethought in a pragmatic and non-clientelist manner, could thus restore truly functional decision-making and mediation spaces. And a restoration of trust in neutrality\u2026<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">The core of the problem in Ituri remains that the Republic is distant, absent and insensitive. The state's presence is often only visible through an episodic army or administration, without lasting roots in the social fabric. This failure paves the way for self-justice dynamics and the rise of extreme violence. The question that then arises is: can current conflicts degenerate into ethnic cleansings, like those that marked Ituri in the early 2000s? The answer is that they already have. The difference is that this time, less is said about it, because it is difficult to point the finger at a foreign state directly involved. But in fact, we have already entered a phase of cleansing \u2014 silent, progressive, and perhaps even more dangerous, because it unfolds in a low-key manner without provoking a proportional reaction.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">This observation demands a proactive and lucid approach: addressing structural causes, breaking the reflexes of ethnicising conflicts, rethinking local governance, and restoring a continuous republican presence in order to prevent the anchoring of an irreversible cycle of massive violence.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-group has-background\" style=\"border-radius: 6px; background-color: #0f1f13; padding: 36px 40px 36px 40px;\"><div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-07cf3d84 wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #4cde80;\">Is the use of a portion of these rival militias by the Congolese army to try to stop the current insurrection an approach likely to lead to a sustainable solution or to have a contrary result, namely conflagration?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #d4ead7;\"><strong style=\"color: #ffffff;\">Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> <em>Resorting to armed civilians, grouped under the term militias, has never constituted a viable solution. It is already, implicitly, taking sides. Yet in the Iturian context, taking sides \u2014 even under the pretext of federating rival militias for a common objective \u2014 amounts to undermining any prospect of a solution carried or imagined by the Republic. Such an approach only adds an extra layer of complexity to an already deeply rooted problem. There is no such thing as a \"good\" militia on one side and a \"bad\" one on the other: all contribute to the fragmentation of legitimate authority, mass killings, and the replacement of law by force.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #d4ead7;\"><em>The approach adopted by the Congolese government regarding CODECO groups illustrates this trap. By seeking to integrate or accommodate some of these armed actors, it has contributed to amplifying the so-called \"Za\u00efre\" phenomenon. On one hand, maintaining a militia becomes for its sponsors a lever to access more sophisticated armed means and move closer to central power, a form of recognition by authority. On the other hand, this proximity fosters a reflex of survival and self-defense among rival groups, pushing them to strengthen their own armed structures to protect themselves against a threat perceived as now backed by the state.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #d4ead7;\"><em>This dual mechanism sustains a spiral where each concession made to a militia fuels others, where each attempt at an armed alliance further weakens republican authority, and where violence ends up legitimising itself. Far from reducing insecurity, this logic perpetuates it, by institutionalising the presence of armed groups in the management of local affairs and making any peaceful exit from the conflict even more uncertain.<\/em><\/p>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">How do you view the relapse of former rebel leaders, such as Thomas Lubanga, condemned by the International Criminal Court for the same facts?<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> It would be fairer to view Thomas Lubanga as an actor seeking to exploit the current dynamic of security hemorrhage in Ituri \u2014 coated with an ethnic veneer through media coverage picked up by M23 relays \u2014 in order to reposition himself on the political scene with a view to a potential dialogue. Nothing more. His past before the International Criminal Court brings no particular significance today to his present engagement. It is even probable that the survival of his community does not constitute the engine of his new armed enterprise. On the contrary, by adopting this posture, he seems to be betting on a political capital that he hopes to convert into dividends during a national negotiation. The problem, for him as for his allies, is that the conditions for a national dialogue have not been put in place in the short term, rendering his gamble premature and potentially more deadly.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<figure class=\"wp-block-pullquote is-style-default\" style=\"border-color: #1a7a3c; border-width: 3px; font-size: 21px;\">\r\n<blockquote>Ituri must be perceived as a thermometer of our general situation. Its fever is the most visible symptom of a deeper malaise running through the entire country. <cite>\u2014 Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene to <em>Factualit\u00e9 Afrique<\/em><\/cite><\/blockquote>\r\n<\/figure>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">Do Ituri's enormous subsoil potential (minerals and oil) as well as the wealth of its soil and biodiversity (cocoa, timber) have any link with the current resurgence of armed violence?<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> One might think that Ituri's mining and oil potential directly fuels the current disintegration, but this factor is not as structuring as one might imagine. This remains a hypothesis, and above all a partial reading. Most local militias do not operate with a long-term agenda: they obey cyclical conjunctural logics, yet without real strategic projection capacity. Mining and oil implications must rather be viewed from other angles. The Albertine oil basin, for example, is transboundary and shared between several states. If insecurity on one side prevents exploitation and allows the stable side to siphon its resources optimally, the latter could have an objective interest in seeing disorder persist with its neighbour. Is this already the case? It is impossible to state this without direct evidence, unless one examines the trajectory of the joint FARDC-UPDF operations, initially centered around Beni, then progressively extended towards northern Ituri.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">This is not about giving in to conspiratorial reflexes, but about understanding that certain short-term dynamics fit together mechanically. The militia leader or small gold and ivory trafficker acts neither in the name of his community nor with a view to a political project aimed at eradicating a supposedly rival ethnic group. He exploits the ethnic label as a narrative resource, a convenient flag to legitimise his predation and justify his actions to his supporters. His horizon is often limited to the short term: surviving, making his trafficking thrive, and, if the opportunity arises, hitting the jackpot before disappearing to other countries. On the other hand, his arms or fuel supplier, with whom he exchanges his loot, may pursue a broader strategy inscribed in the long term, taking advantage of porous borders and local chaos.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">For years, we have thus witnessed an almost mechanical rotation: new militias appear, inheriting the networks and methods of those that disappear or fragment, while changing their names and patron figures. But behind this apparent diversity lies the same matrix: organised bandit groups that instrumentalise identity narratives as a tool for social control and terror. They kill less to defend an identity than to secure their trafficking corridors, impose fear and deter any hindrance to their business. This mechanism, as long as it is not broken, will continue to recycle the same violence under new labels.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">Do the M23 war in Kivu, alongside the settlement of former president Joseph Kabila in this area under the control of Corneille Nangaa's Alliance Fleuve Congo platform, have any bearing (and if so, what kind?) on the development of the security situation in Ituri?<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> To date, there is no solid evidence establishing a direct link between Joseph Kabila and the current crisis in Ituri. The only observation that can be made is that the situation on the ground has not fundamentally changed: before Kabila as after Kabila, Ituri continues to count its dead and displaced persons, with its share of tears and frustrations. Perhaps this adds an extra layer of community resentment, fuelled by the impression of continuity in the state's inaction or inefficiency, regardless of the figurehead leading it. As for Corneille Nangaa, he does not have a real foothold in Ituri. He is a man of urban networks, accustomed to the negotiations of major capitals, and not an actor rooted in local realities. Imagining a generalised allegiance of Iturians to Kabila or Nangaa therefore makes little sense.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">What does deserve attention, however, is M23's capacity to exploit identity narratives as a strategic lever. Its military machine relies on a vast and better-coordinated supply network than that of most other armed groups in the region. In this area, M23 plays the role of a \"teacher's pet\" upon which several militias not aligned with Kinshasa depend, voluntarily or out of necessity. The latter rely on it to train their fighters, access weapons circuits and benefit from more structured operational know-how.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">It should also be noted that certain M23 members originating from regions other than Kivu struggle with their confinement in this restricted geographical space. They aspire to break out of this straitjacket to claim a more national stature, to operate within a broader theatre of operations. The crisis in Ituri thus becomes a strategic opportunity: a terrain where regional ambitions, appetites for power and the desire to expand influence intersect. This context attracts not only actors close to M23, but also other opponents of the central government who see Iturians' instability as a favourable space to advance their own agendas, often fishing in troubled waters.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 40px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-group has-background\" style=\"border-radius: 6px; border-left: 5px solid #1a7a3c; background-color: #f0f9f4; padding: 36px 40px 36px 40px;\"><div class=\"wp-block-group__inner-container is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-07cf3d84 wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\">\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 17px; font-weight: bold; line-height: 1.6; color: #1a7a3c;\">Is there a sustainable alternative to this cycle of armed violence with its multiple consequences for civilians in the eastern region of Congo and particularly in Ituri?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #1a2e1e;\"><strong>Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene:<\/strong> Saying that we must \"restore state authority\" to stabilise Ituri is too generic, almost hollow a formula, if we do not first pose the fundamental question: does a state actually exist in these territories? Before claiming to restore anything at all, we must first recognise that in many places the state is only present through residual administrative traces or ad hoc security interventions, without continuity or institutional depth.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #1a2e1e;\">This is why it would be more relevant to start by seeking to understand what is really happening in Ituri. Yet this approach has never been conducted in a serious, exhaustive and honest manner. Most approaches have settled for quick responses and superficial analyses, as if Ituri were merely an exotic exception to our national problems. However, if so many solutions have failed, it is probably because we have not understood, or have misunderstood, the real nature of Iturians' problems.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #1a2e1e;\">These problems are not isolated cases. Their equivalents are found in other provinces: poorly arbitrated land tensions, failing local governance, the fragmentation of economic networks, the instrumentalisation of identities. The difference is that Ituri's sociology \u2014 its ethnic composition, its historical heritage, the density and superposition of its fractures \u2014 acts as an amplifier. What produces latent tensions elsewhere degenerates more quickly into open violence in Ituri.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\" style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #1a2e1e;\">It is from this perspective that we must begin to view Ituri: not as a special case to be handled separately, but as a thermometer of our general situation. Its fever is the most visible symptom of a deeper malaise running through the entire country. To ignore it, or to treat it as an anomaly, is to deprive oneself of the opportunity to understand our entire system as a whole. Making Ituri an observatory of our dysfunctions \u2014 political, administrative, economic and social \u2014 would already be a step towards a solution. Understanding this territory in its complexity means beginning to understand the logics that are undermining our entire state. And it is only from this fine understanding that we can envisage responses that go beyond slogans and enter the realm of genuine institutional reconstruction.<\/p>\r\n<\/div><\/div>\r\n<p style=\"font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.95; color: #222222; padding-left: 24px;\">\r\n\r\n<\/p>\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-spacer\" style=\"height: 32px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\">\u00a0<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ituri: fluid mechanics of an ignored conflict &nbsp; \u00a0 By Fiston Mahamba Larousse to Marcel-H\u00e9ritier Kapitene, actuary, economist and expert on conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes. What is your personal analysis of the current security situation in Ituri province, with armed attacks against civilians but also the resurgence of&hellip;<\/p>","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":16985,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"elementor_theme","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89],"tags":[100,95,94,93,97,90,99,92,102,103,104],"class_list":["post-16984","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-focus","tag-condamnation","tag-congo","tag-cpi","tag-crp","tag-guerre","tag-ituri","tag-justice","tag-lubanga","tag-m23","tag-rdc","tag-ressources-naturelles","category-89","description-off"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16984"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17023,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984\/revisions\/17023"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/16985"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16984"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16984"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/factualiteafrique.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16984"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}